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Abstract
This paper examines whether a tipping point exists for real GDP growth in Italy
above which the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans falls signicantly.
Estimating a heterogeneous dynamic panel-threshold model with data on 17 Italian
regions over the period 19972014, we provide evidence for the presence of growth-
threshold e¤ects on the NPL ratio in Italy. More specically, we nd that real GDP
growth above 1.2 percent, if sustained for a number of years, is associated with a
signicant decline in the NPLs ratio. Achieving such growth rates requires decisively
tackling long-standing structural rigidities and improving the quality of scal policy.
Given the modest potential growth outlook, however, under which banks are likely to
struggle to grow out of their NPL overhang, further policy measures are needed to put
the NPL ratio on a rm downward path over the medium term.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans in Italy has reached very high levels
(see Figure 1) post global nancial crisis. Total NPLs appear to have broadly stabilized
at about e356 billion at end-June 2016 (about 18 percent of total loans; 20 percent of
GDP; and one-third of the Euro Area total), and, as a ratio of total assets, they were
mostly concentrated in the south of the country (see Figure 2).1 High NPLs are a drag on
bank protability and may also adversely a¤ect economic activity in various ways. First, a
bank experiencing high NPLs will likely focus on internal consolidation and improving asset
quality rather than providing new credit to the private sector. Second, high NPLs require
greater loan loss provisions, which reduce the available resources for lending.2 Third, an
NPL overhang can result in a misallocation of resources diverting funds away from more
productive parts of the economy, thereby hampering a countrys long-term growth prospects;
see Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero et al. (2008) who explore the phenomenon of
zombie lending and evergreening in Japan.3
In addition to active policy measures to tackle NPLs, cyclical factors can play a role in
reducing NPLs. Faster economic growth is expected to lead not only to an expansion in total
credit (the denominator of NPL ratio) but also in a stabilization or reduction in stock of
NPLs (the numerator) through (i) a reduction in the new ow of NPLs as rmsprobability
of default falls; (ii) an improvement in prospects of rms whose loans may have become
non performing, resulting in previous NPLs becoming performing again; (iii) an increase in
the disposal of NPLs as recovery values improve; and (iv) an increase in bank protability,
leading to higher retained earnings, higher provisions and greater write o¤s (see Jobst and
Weber 2016).4
1Net of provisions, current NPLs amount to about 191 billion (10.4 percent of total loans); out of these, 88
billion (4.8 percent of loans) are represented by bad loans - i.e. exposures to insolvent debtors; the remaining
103 billion relate to situations in which repayments may still resume.
2See also Dörr et al. 2017 who examine the implications for rm productivity of adverse shocks to
bank lending in Italy. They nnd that a negative shock to bank credit supply reduces rmsloan growth,
investment, capital-to-labor ratio, and productivity.
3The empirical literature points to some feedback e¤ects from NPLs to growth. For Italy, Filosa (2007)
concludes that deterioration (improvement) in the quality of loans weakens (reinforces) real economic activity
and ination in Italy. Klein (2013) shows that an increase in NPLs has a signicant negative impact on credit,
real GDP growth, unemployment, and ination in emerging Europe. Nkusu (2011) estimates the reaction of
an economy to a sudden increase in the NPL ratio in a sample of 26 developed countries and nds a strong
negative impact that persists for four years after the initial shock. Using a newly constructed dataset on
NPL reduction episodes, Balgova et al. (2016) illustrate that a reduction in NPL ratios leads to faster GDP
growth, higher credit growth and investment, and better labor market outcomes.
4The modest economic recovery in Italy since 2014 has resulted in a gradual improvement in the quality
of credit: the ow of new NPLs has decreased to the lowest levels since 2008 and the total stock of NPLs
has broadly stabilized since the end of 2015.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the NPL Ratio Over Time
Source: Authorsconstruction based on Bank of Italy data.
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of NPL Ratios (Averages over 1997-2014)
Source: Authorsconstruction based on Bank of Italy data.
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Empirical evidence indeed suggests that economic activity is one of the main drivers of
NPL ratios. Beck et al. (2013) nd that for a dynamic panel of 75 advanced and emerging
economies, real GDP growth is the most important determinant of asset quality. Nonetheless,
other factors such as exchange rate and interest rate movements may also play a role. These
ndings are broadly in line with other cross-country analyses; see, for instance, Espinoza and
Prasad (2010), Nkusu (2011), Glen and Mondragón-Vélez (2011), and Klein (2013). With
regard to Italy-specic studies, using a dynamic panel-data analysis covering the 62 largest
Italian banks, Garrido et al. (2016) show that while economic growth has been the most
important determinant of the NPL buildup following the crisis, this was exacerbated by bank
specic factors. Quagliariello (2007) concludes that Italian banksriskiness and protability
are a¤ected by the evolution of the business cycle. Using Italian credit registry data, Bofondi
and Ropele (2011) nd that the quality of lending to households and rms can be explained
by a small number of macroeconomic variables mainly related to the general state of the
economy, the cost of borrowing, and the burden of debt. Finally, Notarpietro and Rodano
(2016) argue that the slowdown in GDP growth following the global nancial crisis and the
European sovereign debt crisis is a major contributor to the rise in bad debts in Italy.
Motivated by the above cross-country experience, which highlights the importance of fast
growth for reducing NPLs, this paper asks: Can Italy grow out of its NPL overhang? We
contribute to the literature by investigating whether there is a non-monotonic relationship
between real GDP growth and the NPL ratio in Italy while accounting for potential feed-
back e¤ects from the NPL ratio to real GDP growth. In other words, we investigate whether
there exists a tipping point for real GDP growth in Italy beyond which the NPL ratio falls
signicantly (i.e., by about 510 percent per year). To this end, we specify a heterogeneous
dynamic panel-threshold model and provide formal statistical tests of growth-threshold ef-
fects on NPL ratios in a sample of 17 Italian regions over the period 19972014.
There are a number of advantages to our within-country analysis relying on Italian region-
level GDP growth and NPL ratios data, as opposed to investigating the non-linear relation-
ship between the NPL ratio and growth by conducting cross-country or time-series analysis
for Italy. For instance, estimating the growth threshold on NPL ratios in a cross-country
framework runs the risk of being distorted owing to cross-country heterogeneity and vary-
ing denitions of NPLs. Moreover, utilizing within country data allows for a more accu-
rate/e¢ cient inference of model parameters than from time-series regressions using all-Italy
data or from cross-country panel data models. Note also that our estimation strategy takes
into account dynamics, regional heterogeneity, and feedback e¤ects between NPL ratios and
growth. Acknowledging that cyclical developments are an important driver of NPL ratios in
Italy, we distinguish between the short-term and long-term e¤ects of faster growth on NPL
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ratios, and focus on the latter.
We nd a statistically signicant growth-threshold e¤ect on the NPL ratio in Italy at
about 1:2 percent, once we account for cross-region heterogeneities, simultaneous determina-
tion of the NPL ratio and growth, and dynamics. Moreover, we nd that there is a signicant
and robust negative long-run association between economic growth and NPL ratios. Quanti-
tatively, a one percentage points faster growth than the baseline in Italy, if persistent, would
reduce the NPL ratio by about 6:5 to 9:5 percent per year (i.e. halving the NPL ratio in
3  6 years).
Given Italys moderate growth outlook, banks could thus struggle to grow out of their
NPL overhang. Italy has experienced historically weak economic growth (and negative pro-
ductivity growth) predating the global nancial crisis (Figure 3). It is, therefore, important
for Italy to improve its growth prospects compared to the currently moderate outlook see
Figure 4 (with real GDP growth projected by a number of analysts including IMF sta¤,
European Commission, OECD, some investment banks and think tanks to remain close to
1 percent over the next few years) by fully implementing the reform e¤orts pursued in re-
cent years and scaling them up, lowering Italys high levels of public debt, and ensuring a
pro-growth mix of spending and tax measures.
Figure 3: Average Real GDP and TFP Growth (1997-2014)
Source: The annual macro-economic database of the European Commissions Directorate General for Eco-
nomic and Financial A¤airs (AMECO).
This also means that active NPL resolution measures are needed to bring NPL ratios
on a rm downward trajectory over the medium term. The Italian authorities have already
4
Figure 4: Real GDP Growth (1997-2021)
Source: Authorsestimates and IMF projections.
introduced several measures to deal with the NPL problem. These include steps to improve
the insolvency system, foster consolidation within the highly fragmented banking sector,
and facilitate securitization and sale of NPLs. However, the insolvency reforms, once fully
implemented, are expected to yield benets only gradually over time. Thus, additional mea-
sures are needed to deal with the existing high stock of NPLs, including more intensive use
of out-of-court debt restructuring mechanisms; strengthened supervision; and a systematic
assessment of asset quality for banks not already subject to the ECB comprehensive as-
sessment, with follow-up actions in line with regulatory requirements; for more details, see
Garrido et al. (2016). Should the need arise, e¤ective use of the framework for the prompt
resolution of banks is also important and concerns related to the bail-in of retail investors
should be dealt with appropriately (International Monetary Fund 2016).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our panel threshold
model. Section 3 reports the ndings on growth-threshold e¤ects and the long-run relation-
ship between economic growth and the NPL ratio. Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
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2 A panel threshold NPL ratio growth model
We begin our econometric analysis with the following specication for the change in NPL
ratio (dit):
dit = i;d + 'I (yit > ) + di;t 1 + yi;t 1 + eit, (1)
for i = 1; 2; :::; N; and t = 1; 2; :::; T;
and combine it with an equation for real GDP growth, yit
yit = i;y + {yi;t 1 +  di;t 1 + "it, (2)
Both specications include xed e¤ects, i;d and i;y, but to simplify the exposition, we
initially assume homogeneous slopes. Equation (2) allows for feedbacks from lagged NPL-
ratio growth ( 6= 0) to real GDP growth. It is important to note that even if  was
known, estimates of ' based on (1), would be subject to a substantial simultaneity bias
when "it is correlated with eit, regardless of whether lagged variables are present in (1)
and/or (2). To deal with this bias, we model the correlation between the two innovations
and derive a reduced form equation, which allows us to identify the threshold e¤ect in the
NPL-ratio equation, given that the threshold variable is excluded from the growth equation
(our identication condition).5 To this end, assuming a linear dependence between the
innovations, we have
eit = i"it + uit, (3)
where uit = eit E(eit j"it ), and by construction uit and "it are uncorrelated. The coe¢ cient
i measures the degree of simultaneity between NPL ratio and growth innovations for region
i. Substituting (3) in (1) and then substituting (2) for "it, we obtain the following "reduced
form" panel threshold-ARDL specication for dit:
dit = ci + 'I (yit > ) + idi;t 1 + i0yit + i1yi;t 1 + uit, (4)
where ci = i;d   ii;y, i =    i , i0 = i, and i1 =    i{. Conditional on
(di;t 1;yit;yi;t 1) and under our identication assumption, uit and I [yit >  ] are un-
correlated and, hence, for a given value of  , ' can be consistently estimated after the xed
e¤ects and the heterogeneous dynamics are ltered out. The threshold coe¢ cient,  , can
then be estimated by a grid search procedure, see Chudik et al. (2017) for details. Since the
5Nonetheless, we do not rule out the possibility of indirect threshold e¤ects through the feedback variable,
di;t 1:
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focus of the analysis is on ', assumed to be homogeneous, (4) can be estimated treating the
other coe¢ cients, ci, i, i0, i1, as heterogeneous.
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2.1 Panel tests of threshold e¤ects
Testing the hypothesis ' = 0 requires non-standard test statistics because under ' = 0,
the threshold parameter  disappears. Chudik et al. (2017) develop such tests in the con-
text of heterogenous dynamic panel data models.7 Using vector notations and replacing
'I [yit >  ] in (1) with '0f (yit; ),8 equation (4) for t = 1; 2; :::; T can be written com-
pactly as
di = Qii +'
0Fi () + ui; for i = 1; 2; :::; N , (5)
where di is a T  1 vector of observations on dit, Qi is a T  h observation matrix of
regressors qit = (1;di;t 1;yit;yi;t 1)
0, h = 4, and Fi () is a T r matrix of observations
on the threshold variables in f (yit; ). The ltered pooled estimator of ' for a given value
of  is given by
'^() =
"
NX
i=1
F0i ()MiFi ()
# 1 NX
i=1
F0i ()Midi,
where Mi = IT   Qi (Q0iQi) 1Qi, and Qi covers the set of regressors (ltering variables)
in specications (1) and (2), from which the empirical panel threshold-ARDL model (4) is
derived. The SupF test statistic for testing the null hypothesis ' = 0 is given by
SupF = sup
2H
[FNT ()] ; (6)
where H represents the admissible set of values for  and
FNT () =
(RSSr  RSSu) =r
RSSu= (n  s) ;
in which RSSu is the residual sum of squares of an unrestricted model (5), RSSr is the
residual sum of squares of the restricted model under the null ' = 0, n is the number of
6Owing to the intrinsic regional heterogeneities in Italy, the growth thresholds are most-likely region
specic. Relaxing the homogeneity assumption, whilst possible in a number of dimensions, is di¢ cult when
it comes to the estimation of region-specic thresholds, because due to the non-linearity of the relationships
involved, identication and estimation of region-specic thresholds require much larger time series data than
are currently available. Moreover, the methodology treats the threshold variable as being time-invariant,
while it might have decreased with underlying improvements in insolvency regime over time.
7For a recent empirical application of the panel test of threshold e¤ects see Mohaddes and Raissi (2016).
8Where f (yit; ) is a vector of r threshold variables and ' is the r1 vector of corresponding threshold
coe¢ cients.
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available observations (n = NT ), and s is the total number of estimated coe¢ cients in the
unrestricted model (s = Nh+ r). Similarly, we dene AveF test statistics as
AveF =
1
#H
X
2H
FNT (); (7)
where #H denotes the number of elements of H. The asymptotic distributions of the SupF
and AveF test statistics are non-standard, but can be easily simulated. When only one
threshold variable is considered (r = 1), as is the case in our empirical application, we use
the square root of FNT () in (6) and (7) to obtain the SupT and AveT test statistics,
respectively.
3 Empirical ndings
We argue that the relationship between economic growth and the NPL ratio is non-monotonic
i.e., a real GDP growth above a certain threshold is needed to reduce the NPL ratio sig-
nicantly. To support this argument, we construct regional NPL ratios based on supervi-
sory returns data from the Bank of Italy and obtain regional real GDP data from Italys
National Institute for Statistics (Istat),9 and then provide a formal statistical analysis of
growth-threshold e¤ects on NPL ratios, using a panel of 17 Italian regions over the period
19972014. We allow for region-specic heterogeneity in dynamics, error variances, and
cross-region correlations, but assume homogeneous threshold parameters. Furthermore, we
examine the long-term e¤ects of economic growth on NPL ratios using both ARDL and DL
specications discussed in Chudik et al. (2016).
3.1 Tests of the growth-threshold e¤ects
We begin with the following baseline autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specication,
which extends (4) to p lags,
dit = ci + 'I (yit > ) +
pX
`=1
idi;t ` +
pX
`=0
i`yi;t ` + vit; (8)
9We use end-of-year data on NPL ratios by region. From 1997-2007, we use supervisory returns data
compiled by the Bank of Italy on the non-performing/total loans ratio (percentage) for the di¤erent regions.
NPLs comprise overdue, substandard, restructured and impaired loans. From 2008-2014, we compile our
own NPL ratio adding up loans across those four NPL categories and dividing them by total loans (total
maturity). We have data on 17 regions, as opposed to 20, as some regions are grouped together in the Bank
of Italys statistical database after 2007.
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and, following Chudik et al. (2016), we also consider the alternative approach of estimating
the long-run e¤ects using the distributed lag (DL) counterpart of (8), given by
dit = ci + I (yit > ) + iyit +
pX
`=0
i`
2yi;t ` + vit; (9)
The threshold variable I (yit > ) takes the value of 1 if real GDP growth is above  and zero
otherwise. As before yit is the log of real GDP and dit is the log of NPL ratio. As explained
in Chudik et al. (2016), su¢ ciently long lags are necessary for the consistency of the ARDL
estimates, whereas specifying longer lags than necessary can lead to estimates with poor
small sample properties. The DL method, on the other hand, is more generally applicable
and only requires that a truncation lag order is selected. We use the same lag order, p, for
all variables/regions but consider di¤erent values of p, with pmax = 2, to investigate the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of the lag order. Note that the maximum lag order of
2 should be su¢ cient to fully account for the short-run dynamics given that we are working
with growth rates, see Chudik et al. (2017) for details.
Table 1: Tests of real GDP growth-threshold e¤ects on changes in NPL ratios
ARDL DL
lags: (1,1) (2,2) p=0 p=1 p=2
Regressions with threshold variable I [yit >  ]
b 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
SupT 4.31z 4.54z 1.89 3.11 3.11
AveT 3.00z 3.13z 1.17 1.88z 1.98z
Notes: The ARDL and DL specications are given by (8) and (9). The SupT and AveT test statistics for
the statistical signicance of the threshold variable I [yit >  ] are reported in the Table. , y and z denote
statistical signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 1 reports the Sup and Ave test statistics for the presence of growth-threshold
e¤ects on NPL ratios based on the ARDL and DL specications, (8) and (9). The Sup and
Ave tests results are statistically signicant in all cases, irrespective of the choice of the lag
order and the estimation procedure (ARDL or DL). Therefore, there appears to be strong
support for the presence of growth-threshold e¤ects on NPL ratios in Italy using ARDL and
DL specications at varying lag orders, with the estimates of the threshold being 1:2 percent
in all cases.
These non-linear e¤ects could be working through several channels. First, su¢ ciently-fast
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growth will likely raise the value of collateral and therefore reduce the gap between market
and book values of NPLs. Distressed debt investors may have an incentive to wait until
they see sustained fast-paced growth before entering the NPLs market. At the same time,
as the di¤erence between market and book values of NPLs close, banks will be more willing
to write o¤NPLs. Second, growth exceeding a certain threshold for a period of time may be
needed for borrowers in distress to be able to service their debt obligations again, and for the
likelihood of further defaults to be reduced. Third, once the economy grows above a certain
rate for some time, protability will be high enough for banks to use retained earnings to
build higher capital bu¤ers, further helping them with the write o¤ NPLs.10
Against the backdrop of long-standing structural rigidities (including product and service
market ine¢ ciencies, wage growth in excess of productivity, high taxation, an ine¢ cient pub-
lic sector, and lengthy judicial processes), Italy is currently not expected to grow above 1.2
percent over the medium term (see Figure 4). Slow growth has prevailed despite important
reform e¤orts over the past two decades, owing in part to weaknesses in implementation.
The potential real GDP growth in Italy exceeded 1.2 percent only before the millennium,
and both long-term average real GDP and TFP growth rates are well below those of similar
economies.11 Therefore, further e¤orts are needed in three important areas to raise potential
growth and help reduce NPL ratios faster: product and service markets; public adminis-
tration; and wage bargaining reform to align wages with productivity at the rm level and
across regions. Moreover, there is a need to actively resolve NPLs as outlined in Section 1.
Ensuring a pro-growth mix of spending and tax measures would also help.
3.2 Estimates of long-run e¤ects
We now turn our attention to the long-run e¤ects of a persistent pick-up in output growth on
NPL ratios, regardless of whether there is a threshold e¤ect. To investigate this, we rely on
the ARDL and DL specications in equations (8) and (9). In a series of papers, Pesaran and
Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the traditional ARDL
approach can be used for long-run analysis, and that the ARDL methodology is valid re-
gardless of whether the regressors are exogenous, or endogenous, and irrespective of whether
the underlying variables are I (0) or I (1). These features of the panel ARDL approach are
appealing as reverse causality could be very important in our empirical application. While
high NPLs may have an adverse impact on economic growth, low GDP growth could also
10Although not explicitly testing for threshold e¤ects, Fujii and Kawai (2010) show that in Japan over
the period 1997-2007, the outstanding NPL ratio rose when GDP growth was below 1 percent and declined
when it exceeded 1 percent, except in one year (2000).
11Note that potential output estimates have a high degree of uncertainty.
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lead to higher NPLs. We are indeed interested in studying the relationship between out-
put growth and NPL ratios after accounting for these possible feedback e¤ects. We also
utilize the DL approach for estimating the long-run relationships for its robustness. Both
ARDL and DL specications allow for a signicant degree of cross-region heterogeneity and
account for the fact that the e¤ect of a persistent pick-up on growth on NPL ratios could
vary across regions (particularly in the short run), depending on region-specic factors such
as institutions, geographical location, or cultural heritage.
Table 2: Mean group estimates of the long-run e¤ects of real GDP growth on
changes in NPL ratios (1997-2014)
ARDL DL
lags: (1,1) (2,2) p=0 p=1 p=2
(a) Regressions with threshold variable I [yit >  ]
b -8.337z -8.635z -6.944z -8.588z -9.533z
(0.5719) (0.6903) (0.4643) (0.5923) (0.7528)
(b) Regressions without threshold variables
b -6.472z -6.522z -6.676z -7.016z -7.541z
(0.5616) (0.7994) (0.5811) (0.7304) (0.5139)
Notes: The ARDL and DL specications are given by (8) and (9). Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Statistical signicance is denoted by , y and z, at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The least squares estimates obtained from the panel ARDL and DL specications are
reported in Table 2. Panel (a) reports the results for models with threshold variables. Panels
(b) shows the results when the threshold variables are excluded. Each panel gives the Mean
Group (MG) estimates of the long-run e¤ects of real GDP growth, yit, on changes in NPL
ratios. As shown in Pesaran and Smith (1995), the MG estimates are consistent under fairly
general conditions so long as the errors are cross-sectionally independent.
The results across all specications suggest an inverse relationship between GDP growth
and changes in NPL ratios. Specically, Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cients of real GDP
growth, b, are negative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, with their values
ranging from  6:5 to  9:5 across various estimation techniques (ARDL and DL), and lag
orders. In other words, a one percentage point faster growth than the baseline, if it persists,
would reduce the ratio of NPLs by about 6:5 to 9:5 percent per year (i.e., halving the NPL
stock in 3  6 years).
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3.3 Robustness to ination dynamics
To check the robustness of our analysis to ination dynamics, we ran the model with nominal
GDP growth and got a "nominal GDP growth" threshold estimate of about 3 percent (Table
3). Note that GDP deator in Italy grew on average by about 2 percent over 1997-2014.
Considering that ination in Italy is projected to remain signicantly below the European
Central Banks target of 2 percent, a decisive reduction in NPL overhang relies on improving
the underlying real growth dynamics (i.e. real GDP growth above 1.2 percent).
Table 3: Tests of nominal GDP growth-threshold e¤ects on changes in NPL
ratios
ARDL DL
lags: (1,1) (2,2) p=0 p=1 p=2
Regressions with threshold variable I

ynominalit > 

b 3:0% 3:0% 3:0% 3:0% 3:0%
SupT 4:78z 4:53z 3:59z 3:04 2:84
AveT 3:01z 2:93z 1:76z 1:57z 1:26
Notes: The ARDL and DL specications are given by (8) and (9). The SupT and AveT test statistics for
the statistical signicance of the threshold variable I

ynominalit > 

are reported in the Table. , y and z
denote statistical signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
4 Concluding remarks
We provided a formal statistical analysis of growth threshold e¤ects on NPL ratios in a panel
of 17 Italian regions over the period 19972014. To deal with di¤erent types of econometric
issues and ensure robustness, we conducted the NPL-growth exercise based on two estimation
methods (ARDL and DL). Our results suggest that for Italy there is a growth-threshold e¤ect
of about 1.2 percent in the relationship between real GDP growth and NPL ratios. That
is, persistent real GDP growth above 1.2 percent for a number of years is needed to reduce
NPL ratios signicantly over the medium term. However, achieving average growth rates
above 1.2 percent requires tackling long-standing structural rigidities, lowering Italys high
levels of public debt, and ensuring a pro-growth mix of spending and tax measures. There is
also an urgent need for additional nancial sector measures to clean up bank balance sheets.
While the authorities have already introduced a number of measures to deal with the NPL
problem, additional measures could help bring down NPL ratios faster, including by more
12
intensive use of out-of-court debt restructuring mechanisms; and strengthened supervision
to facilitate decisive progress in reducing NPLs, among others.
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